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BEGINNINGS IN PRE-TRIAL
L ONARD KEYES*
The relationship between court and counsel by reason of the
diverse functions which each is required to perform in the adminis-
tration of justice, is remindful of what someone has said in describ-
ing marriage as "a relationship of antagonist cooperation." There
always has been, and I presume must of necessity be some area of
conflict between court and counsel in the disposition of a lawsuit.
The judge represents society, and counsel for the respective parties
represent their clients. It is incumbent upon counsel to use every
lawful means to advance the cause of the client regardless of the
justice or injustice of the final result. On the other hand, it is the
duty of the court to afford to each party equal advantage under the
law to the end that a just result may be achieved.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
became effective January 1, 1952. The immediate utilization of these
rules has made manifest this divergence between court and counsel.
Rule 1.01 reads as follows:
"These rules govern the procedure in the District Courts of the
State of Minnesota in all suits of a civil nature, with the excep-
tions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Essential to the effectuation of this purpose is the complete co-
operation between court and counsel. This is particularly true of
pre-trial procedure. Considering two of the words in the last sen-
tence of the rule points up some of the differences which may arise
between court and counsel at the outset.
The word "speedy" in the rule may be productive of conflict be-
tween the court and counsel, particularly counsel for the defense.
To activate the rule, it is necessary in many cases for the court to
align itself with the attorney for the claimant and to rule against
defendant's counsel. justice delayed is justice denied. Since June 15,
A. D. 1215 at Runnymede, a fundamental guaranty of our law has
been, "To none will we - deny or delay right or justice."
The words "inexpensive determination" may have some annoy-
ing connotations. From the lawyer's point of view, the more expen-
sive the litigation, the larger the fee. However, from the standpoint
of the fee earned for services performed, there should be no conflict
between the court and the lawyers by reason of the word "inex-
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pensive." The contract relationship between counsel and client is a
personal relationship with which the court is not particularly con-
cerned.
The court, however, is greatly concerned with the "inexpensive"
operation of the judicial department of the government for the bene-
fit of all of the people. This is the area in which conflict between
court and counsel may arise and very often does. The court must
oppose with vigor counsel who assume that the judicial department
of the government is their own private domain in which they may
hunt and shoot as they please in season and out of season. The courts
do not belong to the lawyers any more than the court house belongs
to the workmen who participated in its construction. The courts be-
long to the people and should be operated for them in the most in-
expensive way possible consistent with good government. Our
courts at best are expensive to operate.
My judicial district consists of four rural counties. The operation
of the court for the trial of jury cases costs the taxpayers of the
county about $300.00 per day. This outlay is small when compared
to the loss suffered by the individuals who are called upon to leave
their work or businesses in order to serve as jurors or appear as
witnesses. Their time is valuable and they cannot be blamed if they
resent any unnecessary and useless infringement upon their lives
or property.
To dismiss the rules summarily by saying that their use is a
matter of discretion, impugns the very framework in which our
courts are required to function. The first and fundamental task of
the judge is to require that the rules which govern the procedure of
the court be scrupulously followed. It is my submission that in the
performance of his high office, the judge is under duty to insist as
follows:
1. On the disposition of all nuisance and meritless claims by pre-
trial and summary judgment procedure without sacrifice of the
rules of fundamental justice.
2. To insist that the parties be present with their witnesses at
the trial and that no delay be caused by the absence of witnesses.
3. To insist that no time be wasted on matters about which no
substantial controversy exists.
4. To require that all exhibits be identified and be offered and
considered before trial so as to do away with time consuming
procedures during the trial with which the jury is in on way con-
cerned.
5. To require counsel before trial, to state the basic claims of the
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parties, the number of witnesses and the testimony to be offered
at the trial.
6. To require counsel before trial, to state to the court, the law
which applies to the case so that the trial may proceed without
delay pending search for, or discussions between counsel and the
court as to the law.
Several years ago, a negligence action was tried before a jury
in my district. Many hours were consumed in selecting a jury. Wit-
nesses were called by both plaintiff and defendant. The court and
jury listened attentively and patiently for three days. At the close of
all of the evidence, counsel for the defendant made a motion for a
directed verdict. The court asked counsel for the plaintiff to indicate
to the court any evidence in the entire record from which the jury
could find negligence on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff's at-
torney frankly stated that there was no evidence of negligence in
the entire record, and then for the first time stated that he was
basing his claim on the rule of res ipsa loquitur. Unfortunately for
plaintiff, the rule did not apply to the facts in the case, and the court
directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. What waste of time and
effort.
In another negligence case, plaintiffs were being transported by
the defendant to a resort in northern Minnesota. The defendant op-
erated his car in such a manner that it left the highway and both
plaintiffs were injured. The selection of a jury and taking of the
testimony in the case consumed about five days. Much of the testi-
mony involved the question of whether the plaintiffs were employees
of the defendant and were engaged in the usual course of their em-
ployment while riding in his automobile. Numerous exhibits were
offered in evidence for the purpose of proving the relationship of the
parties as employer and employees. At the close of the evidence,
defendant's attorney made a motion for a directed verdict on the
ground that the plaintiffs were covered by the compensation act and
hience had no remedy in tort against the defendant. In support of
this motion, counsel submitted to the court a voluminous brief set-
ting forth the law which counsel contended applied.
As a practical matter, with a jury waiting in the court room, the
court could not possibly delay the trial for the purpose of reading
the proffered brief. The jury could hardly have been expected to sit
around for a day or two waiting for the court to consider and rule
upon a difficult question of law. The circumstances required the
court submit to the jury all fact questions involved and ask the jury
to determine whether the plaintiffs were engaged in the course of
[Vol. 38:236
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their employment under the compensation act, and whether the de-
fendant was negligent, whether his negligence was the proximate
cause of injury to the plaintiffs and further, the question of damages
to the plaintiffs. Under the new rules, most of these questions could
have been disposed of at pre-trial with a good possibility that sum-
mary judgment might have been entered to the effect that the plain-
tiffs were governed by the compensation act because most of the
evidence relating to that question was uncontroverted.
I relate this because subsequent to the enactment of the new
rules, a case came before me in which identical issues were involved.
That case was disposed of on the basis of a pre-trial order, setting
forth the undisputed facts upon which a summary judgment was
entered finding that the plaintiffs were governed by the compensa-
tion act, thereby saving the judge, the court attaches, 12 jurors,
counsel for the parties and the many witnesses the necessity of
wasting a week or possibly two weeks in court.
Five years ago, 35 persons were injured in Wright County rid-
ing on a hayrack which was preceeding down a country highway at
night without any lantern or warning light on its rear. The hayrack
was struck by a car approaching it from the rear. One of the occu-
pants was killed and the other 34 sustained injuries. Thirty-five
lawsuits were on the calendar for trial. To have tried each of these
cases separately might have resulted in injustice for the reason that
it could be possible for one occupant to recover of one defendant or
another by one jury and a different result to another occupant might
be reached by a different jury. It would have been possible for one
passenger to recover at the hands of one jury and another passenger
fail to recover anything from a different jury. The court, therefore,
ordered all cases tried together. When that order was made, a num-
ber of the cases were dismissed, some were settled, and when finally
submitted, the actions litigated were between four plaintiffs and
five defendants.
In disposing of the issues between the parties, it was necessary
for the court to submit 32 verdict blanks to the jury. The jury was
instructed to return four of the 32 blanks submitted. To the surprise
of the court and counsel, the jury reached an unexpectedly flawless
result. Under the new rules, the issues in all 35 cases could have
been simplified through pre-trial and liability determined between
the five defendants, and the court could have entered judgment ac-
cordingly for each plaintiff for the amount due each plaintiff as
stipulated between the parties or as determined by the jury in a
special finding as to damages.
1954]
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After three weeks of trial, the evidence reduced the issues be-
tween the parties to these questions: whether the lights on one of
the defendant's automobile were on high or low beam; whether such
automobile was impeding traffic; whether the operator of another
vehicle involved had his car under proper control; whether any one
or more of such violations or the lack of a light on the hayrack was
the proximate cause of the collision. With that simplification of the
issues, all 35 cases could have been submitted to one jury and that
jury could have disposed of all of the issues involved by its answers
to the disputed questions in the form of a special verdict.
On January 2, 1952, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the State of Minnesota, the
rules of the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District were
revised to read as follows:
"Pursuant to Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of Minnesota, a pre-trial calendar is hereby established.
All jury actions, and such other actions as the Court may order,
shall be placed on such calendar for consideration.
Pre-trial hearings of the cases on the pre-trial calendar shall be
held on the first day of each general term of court and on such
following day or days as may be necessary and desirable.
In all causes on such calendar, the Clerk of Court shall mail to
all parties and their attorneys, notice of hearing to be held at a
time to be fixed by said clerk, not less than seven (7) nor more
than thirty (30) days after the date of mailing. On the date and
hour fixed, only those attorneys (representing all the parties)
who are familiar with the cause and are fully authorized to make
binding sitpulations therein will be permitted to appear, and
such attorneys are required to appear, together with their com-
plete files. In the event of any default, the Court will exercise
the same powers as in the event of a default."
Under this rule, every jury case on the calendar is pre-tried a
week or more before the jurors report for service. Following is the
form of notice.
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Plaintiff,
vs. Number
ThpfPt~drnnt
Attorney for.
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NOTICE OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
A pre-trial conference, under Rule 16 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule II of this Court, will
be held in the above case on nt O 'clock
_.m., at which Counsel are directed to appear with their
complete files and be prepared to:
1. State and simplify the issues and amend pleadings
accordingly.
2. Stipulate to facts and documents about which no sub-
stantial controversy exsits.
3. Offer all documentary evidence and exhibits to be
marked and offered in evidence. Unless objection is
made to a given exhibit, it will be considered as admit-
ted without objection.
4. Specify all damage claims as of the date of the con-
ference.
5. Discuss points of law and such other matters as may
aid in the disposition of the action.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
CLERK OF COURT
By
Deputy
Such notice operates as an order from the court and is enforce-
able just as any other order of the court. The court requires counsel
to come to the pre-trial as fully and completely prepared as for trial.
Counsel are expected to know all of the evidence which will be pre-
sented and to state accurately to the court what that evidence will
be. A statement of conclusions is not sufficient nor was any such
statement sufficient before the adoption of the new rules. It has al-
ways been the law that counsel in his opening statement to the jury
was required to state facts and not conclusions, and in the event the
facts stated were not sufficient, the court was required to direct a
verdict against counsel on the opening statement.
Hence, no litigant is entitled to have a jury called for the hearing
of his cause unless at pre-trial counsel is in a position to supply the
court with facts which entitle him to have a jury called for the pur-
pose of hearing the evidence which he claims to have in his pos-
session.
If exhibits are to be offered at the trial, they should also be avail-
able at pre-trial, should be identified and offered. If any exhibits are
not available, the court should be advised as to those that are not
available. This eliminates surprise and usually permits agreement
that they may be received in evidence without objection to founda-
tion.
1954]
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All matters which are not controverted should be stipulated or
admitted. Counsel should be prepared with the law on both liability
and damages. During pre-trial, the court should assist counsel in
eliminating unnecessary controversy and should make every effort
to assist in arriving at the basic dispute or disputes of fact. The
court should discuss the law with counsel that applies to the facts
presented. The court should advise and assist counsel toward a solu-
tion of the case, without trial, when such course appears to be proper.
The court, at the conclusion of the pre-trial hearing, draws a
pre-trial order incorporating all agreed matters, setting forth the
basic dispute between the parties. This order is signed by both
court and counsel at the pre-trial hearing. The order takes the place
of the pleadings and controls the case throughout the trial.
Pre-trial procedure in my district is conducted in open court.
The parties may be present if they wish. It, however, is conducted
exclusively between counsel and the court. The hearings are in-
formal. It should be the time for counsel and the court to "let their
hair down" and discuss all phases of the case honestly and with-
out reservation.
If plaintiff has a good case, he need have no fear. The same is
true of the defendant if he has a defense. If plaintiff has no case, he
has no right to be in court, and if defendant has no defense, plaintiff
should obtain judgment forthwith.
The following are samples of pre-trial orders and verdicts used
in my district since the enactment of the new rules.
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF JUDICIAL DISTRICT
(Husband and wife, two
cases tried together.)
The Attorneys for the parties to the above actions, having
appeared at a pre-trial conference at Anoka, Minnesota on
(date), stipulated and agreed to the following:
That Plaintiff's Exhibit A to X inclusive are received. That
plaintiff has a life expectancy of years. That the collision
between these motor vehicles occurred at a time of day when
lights were required on motor vehicles under the statute. That
both cars were proceeding northerly on Highway ., and that
the car owned by both defendants, as tenants in common, struck
the car owned by plaintiff --------. from the rear.
The only questions in dispute between these parties are as
follows:
1. Was the tail light on the car lighted?
2. Was the lack of a tail light a contributing cause of the
collision?
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3. Damages sustained by each plaintiff.
The case is set down for trial on
Dated this ___ day of ___,19-.
District Judge
Attorney for Plaintiff
Attorney for Defendants
At the close of the evidence, on the basis of the pre-trial order,
the following special verdict was submitted.
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF ANOKA JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Agnes & Anthony
Plaintiffs,
vs. SPECIAL VERDICT
Lawrence & Eleanor _____
Defendants.
Pursuant to the instructions of the Court, the Jury makes
the following Findings of Fact as its Special Verdict herein:
'Was the tail light on the Doege automobile lighted?
(Yes)
Answer "yes" or "no"
If your answer is "no" to the above question, was the lack of a
lighted tail light a contributing cause of the collision?
(No answer)
Answer "yes" or "no"
What sum of money will compensate Agnes for dam-
ages sustained in this collision?
$9,500.00
What sum of money will compensate Anthony for
damages sustained in this collision?
$1,750.00
Dated this __ day of - , 19-.
Foreman or Forewoman
Too much is expected of jurors, when they are required to
understand and apply long instructions involving complicated legal
principles. The jury's sole duty is to determine disputed questions
1954]
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of fact. Have we not in the past gone far afield in our procedure
and permitted the jury to act as the judge of the law as well as the
facts ?
Were it not for pre-trial procedure, the jury would have been
given general verdicts for plaintiff in each case, and general verdicts
for the defendants in each case. The court would have been re-
quired to instruct the jury as to negligence, contributory negligence
and concurrent negligence, proximate cause, the speed statute, look-
out, proper control, the statute with reference to lights on motor
vehicles, the Christensen rule', with reference to imputed negligence
as between a bailor and bailee, and the immunity of the husband
from suit by the wife.
Procedure under pre-trial practice makes it possible in most
cases for the jury to truly act as judge of.the facts and for the court
to then apply the law to the facts as determined by the jury.
Another pre-trial order follows:
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Four Plaintiffs,
vs. Case No.
Several Defendants.
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
That on the 3rd day of January, 1953, at about 11:00 o'clock
a.m., an automobile owned and driven by the plaintiff Kenneth
C. ___ in which the plaintiffs Wayne and Gary
___ were riding as passengers, was being operated in a
northerly direction on Highway Number __ in Anoka County,
Minnesota, at a point near where the __ Road enters High-
way -_ to form a "T" intersection from the west, came into a
collision with an automobile owned by the defendant Earl -,
which was being operated in a southerly direction on said high-
way by his son Donald - , who is now deceased.
That Donald at the time was operating the auto-
mobile with the knowledge, consent and permission of the de-
fendant Earl
Highway Number __ at the point of collision is a three
lane concrete highway consisting of three, nine foot lanes. That
the visibility was good, weather conditions were good except
that there was scattered ice on the highway, and the highway
was covered with a thin sheet of ice at the point of the accident.
The plaintiff claims that the collision occurred in the most
easterly lane of the highway, the lane reserved for north bound
traffic.
1. Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N. W.
2d 406 (1943).
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It is agreed that another car was being operated in a south-
erly direction on the highway at or immediately before the
happening of the accident.
There is no issue of contributory negligence on the part of
the passenger plaintiffs.
Plaintiff - Exhibit A to C inclusive are received. No
objection will be made as to foundation of the bills of Dr.
Plaintiff - Exhibits 1 to 12 are received.
It is ordered that the Plaintiff ____ complaint be amend-
ed in the following particulars: By adding to Paragraph II of the
complaint the following: "And permanent malalignment of his
jaw with malocclusion of the teeth throughout his mouth, and
impairment of his speech." By changing in Paragraph III,
$1,500.00 to $750.00, by adding to the last sentence, "And will
incur medical expense in the future in an amount estimated at
not less than $500.00." By changing in Paragraph IV, the sum
of $450.00 to $415.80. By changing in Paraghaph V, the sum of
$1,000.00 to the sum of $850.00.
The case is set down for trial as the second case for trial on
October 15, 1953, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
That the reading and signing of this order by Counsel is
waived.
Dated this ___ day of ., 19_
District judge
Recently it was my pleasant experience in a negligence case to
secure agreement from all of the parties on all special and general
damages at the pre-trial conference. The only question submitted
to the jury by way of special verdict was the question of liability
as between the two drivers. On the basis of the jury's answers, the
court was in a position to apply the law and enter judgment accord-
ingly in each of the cases.
A number of parties were involved. One of the plaintiffs was the
wife of the driver of the car in which she was riding as a passenger.
It was stipulated at pre-trial that her general damages was in the
amount of $2,500.00. The jury by its special verdict found that her
husband was negligent in the operation of his car and that his
negligence was the sole cause of the collision. Under the law, she
could not recover from her husband. Her claim, however, was
against the other driver. Had all of these cases been submitted to-
gether in the form of a general verdict with instructions from the
court to the effect that she could not recover against her husband,
but that she could recover against the other driver if he were found
to have been the negligent cause of her injuries, it may be that she
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would have recovered a verdict against the other driver in view of
her admitted injuries.
The jury, however, were not permitted to speculate as to which
was to recover from the other. No evidence was permitted during
the trial as to injuries or damages sustained by any party. There
was no possibility of any feeling of sympathy creeping into the case.
The only questions submitted to the jury related to the operation of
the vehicles by the two drivers.
Time does not permit a detailed enumeration of the many fact
questions susceptible to final determination at pre-trial. One more
instance will suffice. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the recent
case of Dockendorf v. Lakie2 admonished the trial courts as follows:
"It is not amiss to call the attention of trial courts to the impor-
tance, in action brought under § 176.06, subd. 2, against a
third-party tortfeasor, of requiring a special verdict on the issue
of special damages for medical expenses. In the absence of such
special verdict, it is impossible to determine whether the jury
allowed anything to the employee for medical expenses. In a
subsequent subrogation action by the employer--or his insurer
-the employee should be required to reimburse the employer
for medical expenses paid only to the extent that he has received
an award therefor under the jury's verdict."3
Proper pre-trial practice in such actions eliminates the use of
special verdicts. The amount of the medical expenses is seldom con-
troverted. The total thereof can be agreed upon at pre-trial and in-
corporated in the pre-trial order, thereby completing the record
without reference to a jury by special verdict or otherwise.
The above examples of pre-trial procedure illustrate what can
be done in tort cases. The possibilities are even greater in cases
where the issues are numerous, involved and complicated. In such
instances much of the chaff can be eliminated at pre-trial, the issues
clearly defined, and the work of the jury greatly simplified. Such
procedure may make it possible even in a complicated case to reduce
the issue to a few specific questions which the jury can answer by
a special verdict rather than by a general verdict. The use of the
special verdict is extremely helpful in cases where the questions are
few and where they can be phrased in non-technical language re-
quiring simple answers.
By the use of pre-trial hearings and orders based thereon, I have
had occasion since the enactment of the new rules to enter summary
2. 61 N. W. 2d 752 (Minn. 1953).
3. Id. at 756-757.
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judgments under Rule 56 in a number of cases. This practice has
been approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the case of
Lindgren v. Sparks.4
The procedure was as follows: Under Rule 56 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment in his
favor against the defendant Sparks or in lieu thereof, directing that
the issue of damages be submitted to a jury for its determination.
A pre-trial conference was held on March 17, 1952, at which
time the defendant Sparks moved for judgment in his favor exon-
erating him from liability to the plaintiff. On the basis of the facts
stipulated to between the parties and incorporated in the pre-trial
order, summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendant on
April 3, 1952, which order was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court.
The procedure followed in the above case represents the ultimate
accomplishment of the purposes of the new rules. It saves the time
of the court, jurors, parties and witnesses and removes from the
shoulders of society responsibility for financing much time con-
suming litigation.
The result in this case is not an exception. In the past two years,
many cases have been disposed of in my district in this manner.
Such dispositions would not have been possible without pre-trial
procedure.
During the first year of the new rules, it is no exaggeration to
say that at least one solid month of jury work was saved by the
operation of the rules in my judicial district. Considering the ex-
pense of litigation to the taxpayer, it is a fair estimate that at least
$10,000.00 was saved. The application of the rules also has made
possible additional saving of time to jurors, parties, lawyers and
others, and afforded them an opportunity to apply themselves to
other pursuits.
The success or failure of the Rules of Civil Procedure of the
District Court will depend in a great measure upon the proper use
of pre-trial. Pre-trial is the essence of the rules. Its use or non-use
rests primarily with the judge. The judge, however, cannot do
everything alone. He must have the cooperation of the bar. Diffi-
culties will be encountered during the adjustment period which can
be overcome by practice and experience.
Other difficulties may be created by certain members of the
legal profession who do not measure up to proper standards of
4. 58 N. W. 2d 317 (Minn. 1953).
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competence and integrity. Fortunately, such individuals are few
in number and can be subjected to proper restraints and control
with pre-trial more easily than under the old procedure.
However, the lawyers with whom I have dealt have shown a
cumulative appreciation of the use of pre-trial. The firm insistence
on pre-trial which was first required by me, is now conjoined by
counsel. Pre-trial has tended to bring the divergent functions of the
court and counsel together so that it is now possible to envision the
day when the members of the bar, as officers of the court, and the
judge, can cooperate in unison "to secure the just, speedy and in-
expensive determination of every action."
To those who may still doubt the efficacy of pre-trial, may I
commend it to them in the words of the poet.
"Only engage and then the mind grows heated.
Begin and then the work will be completed."
